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A B S T R A C T
On July 11, 2012 an eastbound Norfolk Southern train derailed 17 cars within the city
limits of Columbus, OH. Three of the cars that derailedwere carrying over 86,000 gallons of
denatured ethanol. Once breached, the ethanol in the tank cars ignited, fueling a large ﬁre.
The derailment led to the evacuation of over 100 people and cost over $1.2 million. This
paper will detail the on-scene response and failure analysis performed by the NTSB
Materials Laboratory, focusing on the recovered rail that contained 25 transverse detail
fractures.
Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent United States federal government agency charged
with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents, promoting transportation safety, and assisting victims of
transportation accidents and their families. On July 11, 2012 at 2:03 a.m., eastern standard time, an eastbound Norfolk
Southern Railway Company (NS) train derailed 17 cars within the city limits of Columbus, OH at a curve in the track. No train
crewmembers sustained injuries. However, two citizens in the area sustained minor burn injuries. Approximately
100 people were evacuated from an area of 1 mile surrounding the derailment.
The train consisted of 2 locomotives, 97 loaded cars, and 1 empty car. The 3rd through the 19th cars derailed. Of the cars
that derailed, three (positions 12 through 14) containing denatured ethanol breached, released product, and caught ﬁre. The
derailment and ensuing ﬁre destroyed bothmain tracks of the line. The railroad estimated the damage at over $1.2million [1].
During the on-scene investigation,multiple fractured rail segmentswere transported from the derailment site to a separate
location within the Ohio State Fairgrounds for preliminary examination. Thirty-ﬁve rail pieces were recovered from the
derailment area, several ofwhichwere attached to each other by joint bars. Of the pieces recovered, 24 of the exposed fracture
faces exhibited transverse detail fractures, progressive fractures that originate at or near the surface of the rail head. Three of
these rail fragments were transported to the NTSB Materials Laboratory in Washington, DC for additional examination.
Fractured rail has been studied extensively, with many fractures due to contact fatigue from rolling wheels of passing
trains [2,3]. Besides the primary loading on the rail, secondary loading from thermal and residual stresses [4], as well as* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 2025916359.
E-mail address: erik.m.mueller@gmail.com (E. Mueller).
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one of a variety of loading conditions requiring complicated long-term studies to determine appropriate life and inspection
limits of rail under service [6].
The rail industry has classiﬁed rail defects and failures with nomenclature unique to the business [7]. Progressive
fractures initiating at or near the rail surface, called detail fractures in North America, are denoted by the orientation relative
to the rail rolling direction. Transverse detail fractures can initiate due to rolling contact fatigue failure modes such as
shelling (a longitudinal separation of the rail head near the wheel running surface) and head checking (transverse cracking
on the gage corner from excessive surface cold working). These failure modes are typical when shear stresses at the wheel-
rail contact region exceed the limits for the rail steel. Detail fractures also initiate at internal defects in the rail from
manufacturing ﬂaws [8]. Understanding and detecting these and other failure mechanisms is important in preventing
catastrophic derailments due to rail failure.
2. Investigation methods
The rail fragments were inspected using destructive and non-destructivemethods by the NTSBMaterials Laboratory. The
on-scene parts were photographed using a Canon EOS Rebel T3i digital camera. This same digital camera was used in
conjunctionwith a Keyence VHX-1000 digitalmicroscope for laboratory documentation. The digital microscopewas capable
of producing high-dynamic range and composite high depth-of-ﬁeld images.
Specimens excised from the rail fragments were examined using a Zeiss Auriga 40 ﬁeld emission scanning electron
microscope (SEM). This microscope was equipped with a Thermo Scientiﬁc UltraDry NORAN System 7 energy-dispersive X-
ray spectroscopy (EDS) for inspection of chemical composition.
Several metallographic cross sections of the rail fragments were prepared. The cross sections were polished and etched
with 4% Nital. These metallographic specimens were evaluated using a Zeiss Axio Observer Z1m inverted microscope.
Hardness testing was performed using a Wilson Rockwell hardness tester per ASTM E18 using a diamond indenter and
150 kg load to obtain Rockwell C (HRC) values [9]. The HRC hardness values were converted to Brinell (HB) values
[10]. Specimens from the rail fragments were submitted to Lehigh Testing Laboratories in New Castle, DE for chemical
analysis. The chemical compositions were inspected using inductively coupled plasma mass spectroscopy (ICP) as well as a
combustion infrared detection of carbon and sulfur.
3. Results of the investigation
3.1. Columbus, OH on-scene investigation
Each rail piece was arbitrarily labeledwith an identiﬁcation number between ‘‘0’’ and ‘‘200’’ with each endmarked ‘‘A’’ or
‘‘B.’’ The ends of each recovered rail piece were documented as being joined to another rail with a joint bar, torch-cut in the
ﬁeld, or fractured. The total length of recovered pieces was approximately 272 ft.
The web portion of the rail pieces contained raised characters that identiﬁed the size, date, and manufacturer of the rail.
The markings on the rail fragments were consistent with manufacture by three different steel mills: US Steel in February 1979 and September 1981.
 Bethlehem Steelton in September 1981.
 Colorado Fuel and Iron in December 1988.
According to the American Railway Engineering Association (AREA) speciﬁcations applicable at time of manufacture of
the above rail segment, the markings identiﬁed the rail to be 132 pound-per-yard rolled steel [11]. The American Railway
Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association (AREMA) was formed from the merger of the American Railway Bridge
and Building Association, Communications and Signal Division of the Association of American Railroads, and the
Roadmasters and Maintenance of Way Association with AREA in 1997, which now administers the speciﬁcations for rail
manufacture. The rail pieces from the three mills contained the ‘‘CC’’ mark indicating that the steel was control cooled, a
practice used to reduce hydrogen accumulation in the rail and to prevent internal ﬂake formation [12]. The development of
hydrogen ﬂakes during steel manufacture has been shown to cause premature fracture [13].
By visual inspection,many of the running surfaces of the head portions for the rail pieces showed evidence of shelling and
severe rolling-contact fatigue cracks, consistent with head checking [14]. Many of the fracture surfaces contained transverse
detail fractures that extended from the gage side (inward surface facing the wheel ﬂange) of the rail head in areas that
coincided with observed head checking, as shown in Fig. 1.
Transverse detail fractures typically exhibit a smooth texture and dark tinted region relative to other areas on the fracture
surface, consistent with fatigue cracking in the rail head [7,14]. In this case, the dark tinted portions of the fracture surfaces
appeared black or dark brown, consistent with iron oxide on the surface of steel. The area within the detail fracture portions
exhibited crack arrest marks consistent with progressive cracking, later determined to be fatigue [15]. The areas located
outside of the transverse detail fracture showed light gray coarse granular features consistent with overstress fracture
[(Fig._1)TD$FIG]
Fig. 1. Rail samples 10 and 11 showing (a) the fracture face 10A end and (b) a close-up photograph of the fracture face 10A.
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consistent with overstress. Three of the rail fragments with transverse detail fractures (samples ‘‘10’’, ‘‘80’’, and ‘‘130’’) were
examined further at the NTSB Materials Laboratory: Sample ‘‘10’’ (approximately 56 in. long that was battered on the ‘‘A’’ end). Rail piece 10 was attached to rail piece 11 by a
pair of joint bars. Sample ‘‘80’’ (approximately 10 in. long) contained the largest transverse detail fracture.
 Sample ‘‘130’’ (approximately 27 in. long) contained a crack on the running surface of the head.
3.2. Materials laboratory investigation
The fracture face of one of the rail sample 10 (labeled ‘‘10A’’) exhibited mechanical damage that had obliterated many of
the features on the fracture surface. The running surface of the head and the gage side exhibited batter deformation, as
[(Fig._2)TD$FIG]
Fig. 2. Fracture face 10A excised from rail sample 10, after cleaning. The dashed circled area outlines the detail fracture (propagating in the direction of the
arrows) that was present on the battered fracture surface.
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end 10A. The same joint bar had been gouged along its entire length. This correspondedwith gouging found on the gage side
of rail pieces 10 and 11.
Fracture surface 10A was sectioned from the rest of the rail by a cross sectional cut approximately 1 in. from the fracture
and subjected to extensive cleaning. As shown in Fig. 2, the head portion contained a smooth ﬂat plane with coarse radial
marks that ran from left to right. This area contained crack arrest marks consistent with a progressive fracture that extended
from the gage side of the head (making this the 25th transverse detail fracture discovered in the investigation).
The head portions of rail samples 80 and 130 exhibited surface ﬂaking and head checking on the running surfaces (see
Figs. 3 and 4). The gage side of the head from samples 80 and 130 exhibited shell cracks that extended from the upper corner
of the head. The surface below the open shell cracks contained shallow horizontal cracks.
Fracture face 80A from sample 80, which exhibited the largest transverse detail fracture, extended approximately 2.5 in.
below the running surface of the head into the web. This detail fracture encompassed approximately 70% of the worn rail
head (see Fig. 5), calculated as a percentage of the remaining head cross section [17]. The next largest transverse detail
fracture, found on fracture face 80B, encompassed approximately 30% of the worn rail head. Of the 24 exposed fracture faces
exhibiting transverse detail fractures, the size of the transverse detail fractures on the worn head portion of the rail pieces
ranged between approximately 1 and 70%.
Rail sample 130 contained an additional crack that extended between the head and the lower end of the web portion, as
shown in Fig. 4. In the laboratory, the ends of the rail were subjected to a bending stress to intentionally overstress the rail,[(Fig._3)TD$FIG]
Fig. 3. The running surface of rail sample 80, showing the damage on the head adjacent fracture surface 80A. The ﬂaking indicated in the ﬁgure refers to
shallow features in the metal surface that separated from the gage corner of the rail head.
[(Fig._4)TD$FIG]
Fig. 4. Rail sample 130 from (a) running surface of the head and (b) the ﬁeld side. The upper corner of the head on the gage side contained shell crack. An
internal crack was visible on both the running surface and the ﬁeld side of the web.[(Fig._5)TD$FIG]
Fig. 5. Fracture surface 80A from rail sample 80, showing a transverse detail fracture that extended into the web portion from an open shell crack in the
upper corner of the head.
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crack located on the gage side of the head.
Transverse cross sections, which included the head, web, and base portion, were cut from the rail comprising samples 10,
11, 80, and 130. Fig. 7 illustrates an as-manufactured 132 pound/yard rail proﬁle superimposed over the rail cross section.
The superimposed image in Fig. 7 shows the amount of the head wear (approximately 29%).
The height of the rail wasmeasured at the center of the rail between the upper (running) surface of the head and the lower
surface of the base using a digital height gage on a granite table [11]. Table 1 shows themeasured height of rail pieces 10, 11,
80, and 130. The table lists the amount of vertical wear in the head portion (calculated as height difference between as-
manufactured and the accident rail), vertical head wear limit (speciﬁed by NS when rail replacement is recommended), and
wear vertical limit when a slow order was required. A slow order requires passing trains to operate at a reduced speed until
the worn rail is replaced. For service conditions under which this train was operating, the slow order stated not to exceed
25mph. The derailment occurred on amain track that was designated as Federal Railroad Administration Class 2 track, with
a maximum authorized speed of 25mph. NTSB investigators found that the train’s event recorder data indicated the train
was moving at 25mph immediately prior to the derailment, which did not exceed the slow order restriction.
[(Fig._6)TD$FIG]
Fig. 6. The exposed fracture from the intentionally opened crack in Fig. 4, showing a subsurface fatigue crack on the gage side of the head of sample 130.
[(Fig._7)TD$FIG]
Fig. 7. Cross section of rail sample 10, 1 in. from fracture surface 10A, superimposed against the proﬁle of new 132 pound/yard rail (indicated by black
outline). The amount of vertical head loss for this piece was calculated to be approximately 29% relative to a new head.
Table 1
Vertical wear measurements for rail fragments, compared with prescribed limits (132 pound rail).
Rail
piece
Speciﬁed height
for new rail (in.)
Measured height
of service rail (in.)
Difference between
new and service
rail (in.)
NS vertical wear
limita (in.)
Do measurements
exceed NS vertical
wear limits?
When does NS
require a slow
order for worn
rail?b
Require NS
slow order?
10 7 1/8
(7.125)
6.62–6.67 0.46–0.51 Greater than
7/16 (0.4375)
Yes Greater than
9/16 in.
(0.5625 in.)
No
11 6.81–6.87 0.26–0.32 No No
80 6.57–6.63 0.50–0.56 Yes No
130 6.64–6.67 0.46–0.49 Yes No
a When operating on main track 20 million gross tons (MGT) and curve is greater than 58, rail is recommended for replacement (listed for future
replacement) when vertical wear is greater than 7/16 in.
b When operating between 5 and 20 MGT and lateral (side) wear is greater than 9/16 in., trains are to be put into slow ordered until rail is replaced.
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[18]. According to the results of the measurements and NS standards, these rail pieces would have been listed for future
replacement. However, the vertical wear for the four rail pieces (10, 11, 80, and 130) was less thanwould have been required
for a slow order. The lateral wear on the heads was also measured, but none exhibited wear in excess of the NS limits.
A head portion of each rail cross sectionwas cut from the web portion. These portions were ground, polished, and etched.
Examination of the etched sections revealed the head portion of rail piece 11 contained a lighter etched area between the
[(Fig._8)TD$FIG]
Fig. 8.Optical metallography of a cross section of the head of sample 130, showing the upper corner of the head on the gage side angled to view running side
damage and prepared face. Sub-surface cracks extended from ﬂaking areas (4% Nital etch, bright ﬁeld).
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heating, consistent with a ﬁner grain size [19]. The head portion of the remaining cross-sectioned rail pieces showed a
uniformpearlite grain structure across the head, amicrostructure consistentwith ‘‘standard rail’’ [20]. The running surface of
each head cross section contained a thin layer of metal ﬂow consistent with mechanical deformation. The upper corners of
the head contained subsurface cracks that extended from the shelled and highly-deformed areas (Fig. 8). There were no
indications inclusions or untempered martensite in the polished and etched cross sections.
According to the applicable AREA speciﬁcations at the time, rail manufactured between 1979 and 1988 were designated
as ‘‘standard rail’’ or ‘‘high strength rail.’’ ‘‘Standard rail’’ manufactured at the time speciﬁed minimum hardness of 285 HB
for the head; ‘‘high strength rail’’ had speciﬁed hardness between 321 HB and 388 HB for the head [11].
Transverse hardnessmeasurementsweremade laterally between the ﬁeld side (original surface) and core of the rail head.
Another set of traverse hardness measurements were made vertically along the centerline of the rail heads that extended
between the running worn surface and bottom portion of the head. The hardness values for the head portion of rail pieces
80 and 130were consistentwith hardness values for ‘‘standard rail.’’ The hardness values for the head portion of the Colorado
Fuel and Iron rail piece 11 was consistent with hardness values for ‘‘high strength rail.’’
Fracture face 10A contained a transverse detail fracture that was located approximately 1 in. away from an electric ﬂash
butt weld. A section was made through the electric ﬂash butt weld that was polished and etched. The edge of the heat
affected zone (HAZ) was located approximately 0.75 in. from the fusion line. The fusion line showed no evidence of weld
defects. The hardness at the weld was 300 HB (29 HRC), increasing to a maximum of 321 HB (32 HRC) at the approximate
location of the transverse detail fracture, and then tapering to 267 HB (24 HRC) at the edge of the heat-affected zone. The
hardness increased in the base metal to an average of 286 HB (27 HRC).
The head portion of the rail pieces was submitted for chemical analysis. The chemical analysis for rail pieces 10, 80, and
130 were consistent with the prescribed speciﬁcation for ‘‘standard rail,’’ similar to AISI 1580 carbon steel. The chemical
analysis for rail piece 11 was consistent with the prescribed speciﬁcation for ‘‘high strength rail’’ [11].
4. Analysis and discussion
Derailment of rail cars was likely caused by a transverse detail fracture that emanated from the upper corner of the head
on the gage side of a rail. The track in the derailment area contained 25 transverse detail fractures. All the transverse detail
fractures had initiated in the upper corners on the gage sides of the rail heads. The origin of many of the transverse detail
fractures was open shell cracks.
Rail head batter on one of the fracture faces (labeled 10A) was consistent with damage incurred by train wheels running
over the separated segment after fracture of the rail head. Since no other rail pieces showed evidence of similar batter
damage, fracture face 10A was most likely the point of derailment. Even though the battered fracture surface may not
contain the largest or oldest fatigue crack, the batter indicates that this section of rail fell out of alignment ﬁrst.
Because of the post-fracture batter damage to fracture face 10A, the extent of damage prior to the derailment could not be
determined. Even without the damage, determining the time of fatigue crack propagation is often speculative. This is due to
the non-uniform loading typically seen by rails in service. Individual rails are often unevenly supported by rail ties, ballast,
and sub-ballast. These supports can change over time due to service andweather conditions. Furthermore, the freight car and
locomotive weight supported by the rail varies signiﬁcantly.
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the defect size of the transverse detail fracture at the time of the last rail inspection [21]. The analysis estimated that the size
of the transverse detail fracture on fracture face 80B at the time of the last inspectionwas between 10.1 and 11.2% of the head
area. The addition of severe head wear can accelerate the propagation rate of a detail fracture in rail heads [22]. The severity
of wear, amount of head checking, and therefore fatigue damage has been found to increase as the radius in curvature in the
rail decreases [23,24]. The location of this derailmentwas at a curve in the track. These fatigue cracks generally do not require
metallurgical defects to initiate [24].
The probability of detection increases as the size of the crack increases. AREMA currently provides guidance on crack
probability of detection (which was reported as reliability ratio) [25]. For a crack between 10% and 20% of the head area, the
probability of detection on the ﬁrst round of inspection would have been about 65%. The size of transverse detail fracture for
fracture face 80B was in this range. Because detail fractures may not be detected on the ﬁrst round of inspection, more
frequent inspections are often performed on rail expected to have detail fractures in combination with severe head wear.
This accident demonstrates that detail fractures inworn rail heads operating under heavy yearly tonnagewill continue to
grow, even when the trains are operating on a slow order, as discussed in a previous study [26].
Conclusions
The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of this accident was a broken rail that exhibited
evidence of rolling contact fatigue.
While no recommendations were developed speciﬁcally from this accident, the NTSB did reiterate previous safety
recommendations [27]. These recommendations stated for the railroad companies to Review all internal rail defect detection procedures to eliminate exceptions.
 Develop inspection and maintenance programs based on damage-tolerance programs to identify and remove internal
defects before reaching critical size. Use methods that accurately measure rail head wear.
Acknowledgements
In accordance with Title 5 Code of Federal Regulations §2635.807(b)(2), the views expressed in this article do not
necessarily represent the views of the National Transportation Safety Board or the United States Government.
The authors would like to thank David Jeong at the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (U.S. Department of
Transportation) for performing the defect calculation study for this investigation.
References
[1] National Transportation Safety Board Accident. Railroad accident brief report no. RAB1408. Investigation DCA12MR006; 2012, July 11.
[2] Thompson AW, Albert DE, Gray III . Fatigue crack growth in rail steels. In: Rail quality andmaintenance formodern railway operation. 1993;p. 361–72.
[3] Grigorovich KV, Trushnikova AS, Arsenkin AM, Shibaev SS, Garber AK. Structure and metallurgical quality of rail steels produced by various
manufacturers. Russ Metall (Metally) 2006;5(September–October):427–38.
[4] Ravaee R, Hassani A. Fracture mechanics determinations of allowable crack size in railroad rails. J Fail Anal Prev 2007;7:305–10.
[5] Edel KO. Allowable crack sizes for railway wheels and rails. Theor Appl Fract Mech 1988;9:75–82.
[6] Orringer O, Tang YH, Gordon JE, Jeong DY,Morris JM, Perlman AB. Crack propagation life of detail fractures in rails. DOT/FRA/ORD-88/13 DOT-TSC-FRA-
88-1. Washington, DC: US Dept. of Transportation; 1988.
[7] Sperry Rail Service. In: Rail defect manual. Danbury, CT: Sperry Division of Automation Industries, Inc.; 1964.
[8] Tov GM, Vyaz’mina TM. Investigations of the fatigue and fractures of samples of rail steel by a fractographic method. Strength Mater 1976;8(January
(1)):96–9.
[9] ASTM E18: standard test methods for Rockwell hardness and Rockwell superﬁcial hardness of metallic materials. West Conshohocken, PA: ASTM
International.
[10] ASTM E140: standard hardness conversion tables for metals relationship among Brinell hardness, Vickers hardness, Rockwell hardness, superﬁcial
hardness, Knoop hardness, scleroscope hardness, and Leeb Hardness. West Conshohocken, PA: ASTM International.
[11] American Railway Engineering Association. Rail. In: Manual for railway engineering. Chicago, IL: AREA; 1991 [chapter 4].
[12] Besedin PT. The causes of ﬂake formation in steel. Met Sci Heat Treat Met 1959;1(February (2)):17–21.
[13] Aleksandrov IV, Kuznetsov EP, Boikov DV, Mogil’nyi VV, Zakharova TP. Improving rail-steel production. Steel Transl 2013;43(February (2)):69–72.
[14] Masumoto H, Sugino K, Nishida S, Kukihara R, Matsuyama S. Some features and metallurgical considerations of surface defects in rail due to contact
fatigue ASTM STP 644. In: Stone , Knupp , editors. Rail steels—developments, processing, and use. 1978. p. 233.
[15] Sachs NW. Understanding the surface features of fatigue fractures: how they describe the failure cause and the failure history. J Fail Anal Prev
2005;5(2):11–5.
[16] Kerlins V, Phillips A. Modes of fracture. ASM handbook. Fractography, vol. 12. ASM International; 1987. p. 12–71.
[17] Federal Rail Administration. Track inspector rail defect reference manual; 2011;2.
[18] Norfolk Southern Railway. Rail wear limits. MW&S standard procedure 268; 2011.
[19] Wang L, Pyzalla A, Stadlbauer W, Werner EA. Microstructure features on rolling surfaces of railway rails subjected to heavy loading. Mater Sci Eng A
2003;359(October (1–2)):31–43.
[20] Wetscher F, Vorhauer A, Stock R, Pippan R. Structural reﬁnement of low alloyed steels during severe plastic deformation. Mater Sci Eng A 2004;387–
389(December):809–16.
[21] Jeong D, Perlman B. Back-calculation of defect size at time of last rail test for train derailment at Columbus, Ohio on July 11, 2012. Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center, US Dept. of Transportation; 2012.
F. Zakar, E. Mueller / Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 7 (2016) 41–49 49[22] Lyons ML, Jeong DY, Gordon JE. Fracture mechanics approach to estimate rail wear limits. In: Proceedings of the 2009 ASME Rail Transportation Fall
Technical Conference; 2009. p. 137–46.
[23] Zhong W, WangW, Liu Q. Study on fatigue crack behavior of rail in different curve radius. In: Advanced tribology. Berlin: Springer Berlin Heidelberg;
2010. p. 255–6.
[24] Eisenmann J, Leykauf G. The effect of head checking on the bending fatigue strength of railway rails. In: Rail quality and maintenance for modern
railway operation. 1993;p. 425–33.
[25] American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association. Maintenance of rail. In: AREMA manual for railway engineering. Chicago, IL:
AREMA; 2015 [chapter 4-4-1].
[26] Stone DH. Rail developments and requirements for heavy haul railways. In: Kalker , Cannon , Orringer , editors. Rail quality and maintenance for
modern railway operation. 1993. p. 15–26.
[27] Safety recommendations R-08-9 through R-08-12. Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board; 2008, May 22.
